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Abstract: This paper explores the composition and role of the military and polit-
ical elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate (750–809) whose support enabled the
caliphs to maintain sovereignty over their far-flung domains. It considers the im-
portance of different groups, including members of the ʿAbbāsid family, military
commanders from Khurāsān and members of powerful and wealthy families like
the Muhallabīs and the Shaybāni tribal chiefs. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the reasons for the disappearance and effective extinction of this
elite in the years after the great civil war that followed Hārūn al-Rashīd’s
death in 809.
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The governance of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate was a remarkable political and
organizational achievement. For half a century, between the establishment of
the dynasty in 132 H/750 CE and the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd in 193 H/809
CE, the area from Tunisia in the west to Sind and Central Asia in the east was
governed effectively and largely peacefully from Iraq. From 145 H/762 CE, the
city of Baghdad served as the administrative capital, though the distances
which separated it from the far-flung provinces were enormous: it is over
2,000 kilometres from Baghdad to Merv, the political centre of the great province
of Khurāsān, and 1,500 kilometres from the capital to the Holy City of Mecca.
The barīd postal system inherited from the Umayyads and Sasanians was
surprisingly effective at communicating urgent messages over these huge distan-
ces.¹ When the caliph al-Rashīd died in the year 809 at Ṭūs (near Mashhad in
north-east Iran) a messenger brought the news to Baghdad in twelve days, trav-
eling 1,900 kilometres at an average speed of 150 kilometres per day. Similar
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speeds are recorded for the reporting of other crucial events. Not until the inven-
tion of the electric telegraph in the late 19th century was such swiftness bettered.
Information was clearly very important.
Enforcement was much slower. Even without opposition or resistance, ar-
mies could travel no more than 20 kilometres a day, and usually managed
less. That left plenty of time for a provincial rebellion to gather support and mo-
mentum before the forces of central government arrived on the scene. Exercising
control and authority over such enormous distances was always going to be dif-
ficult, and demands for provincial autonomy were correspondingly hard to re-
sist.
Despite these formidable obstacles the ʿAbbāsids maintained their authority
and the cohesion of their caliphate for more than half a century. No later Islamic
dynasty established the same degree of authority over so wide and diverse an
area. The achievement was not the result of absolutist authority, but of the devel-
opment of a stable political and military elite, or rather a series of elites,which at
the same time represented the caliphal government in the provinces and the
provinces to the central government in Baghdad.
While this must have been true for all large pre-modern empires in the Mid-
dle East from the Achaemenids onwards, one factor that distinguishes the ʿAb-
bāsid example is the wealth of information that survives in the sources about
the government of the caliphate. In al-Ṭabarī’s great Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-
mulūk (History of the Prophets and Kings),² there are enough details to build
up a detailed prosopography of the ruling elite, of their origins, connections, suc-
cesses and failures. This is supplemented by universal chronicles such as al-
Yaʿqūbī’s Taʾrīkh (History),³ and provincial accounts such as al-Kindī’s Kitāb
Wulāt Miṣr (Governors of Egypt)⁴ and al-Azdī’s Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (History of
Mosul).⁵
Despite occasional contradictions, we can trace individual families through
several generations in the evidence and get a clear idea of their influence. There
is perhaps no other period in early Islamic history when so much attention was
paid to the appointment of provincial governors and officials far away from the
court and capital. It did not last. By the mid-9th century, the caliphate was domi-
nated by the Turkish and eastern Iranian military of Samarra. Hardly any infor-
mation survives regarding provincial appointments and we cannot reliably trace
the names of governors, even of really important cities such as Basra. The care
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1883.
 Al-Kindī 1912.
 Al-Azdī 1967.
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with which earlier annalists recorded this type of information clearly shows how
important these people and the offices they held were then considered to be.
The key to these patterns of provincial power was the office of wālī, which is
usually translated as governor. The richness of the sources means we can build
up a virtually complete fasti of the governors of all the major provinces of the
caliphate from the ʿAbbāsid revolution to the reign of al-Maʾmūn, though (as
is only to be expected) there are some confusions and ambiguities. The identities
of the men who held these posts are an invaluable measure of the political com-
plexities of the caliphate. The term ʿāmil was also employed to designate this
type of provincial official. The sources sometimes make a distinction between
the office of wālī, in charge of leading prayers and the people in war, and the
ʿāmil, in charge of taxation, but the terms were often used interchangeably
and the distinction between the two offices blurred.⁶
If the annals superficially make the caliph appear as a powerful absolute
ruler, further down the chain of power the governors display effective executive
power over military and civil affairs in the province. These areas are often simply
characterised as ḥarb and ṣalāt (war and prayer), but when sources like al-Kin-
dī’s history of Egypt allow us to peer below the surface, we find governors in a
more complicated situation.⁷ The governors of Egypt were the middle men be-
tween the caliph and his government in Baghdad, which was always seeking
to extract more tax revenue from this rich province, and the local Muslim elites,
who were determined to retain as much of the revenue as possible in the local
dīwān to pay their salaries and those of their followers. The governors’ position
was made more precarious in that they were usually outsiders with few Egyptian
connections; they had to cooperate with or at least not alienate the wujūh, the
local Arab Muslim elite. The wujūh were led by the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa, the chief of
police. Unlike the titular governor, the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa was always chosen from
a small circle of prominent local families and they often served for longer
than their ephemeral superiors. At one level this seems a weak system of govern-
ment, ultimately dependent on the consent of local notables. In reality the sys-
tem was very resilient: the local Egyptian Muslim elite,who never held office out-
side their province and seldom left it, were stakeholders in the ʿAbbāsid rule that
assured their high status. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the caliph-
ate in the 9th century was the breaking of bonds between Baghdad and local
elites by the influx of Turks and eastern Iranians to the top ranks of central gov-
ernment.
 For an overview of the role of provincial governors, see EI2, “Amīr” (A. A. Duri).
 Kennedy 1981, 26–38; Kennedy 1998, 62–85; Mikhail 2014, esp. 136– 159.
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The provincial elite was largely formed by the political genius of the second
ʿAbbāsid caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (136– 158 H/754–775 CE). This cadre gov-
erned the vast ʿAbbāsid Empire; its broad-based nature was vital in keeping
the caliphate together politically and its disappearance after the great civil
war that followed the death of al-Rashīd in 193 H/809 CE was a major factor
in the caliphate’s breakup.
It is sometimes easy to forget how exceptional this pre-war period was and
how impressive was the political success that kept this multi-ethnic, multi-cul-
tural state together. In what follows, I will investigate some important constitu-
ents of the elite of this time to determine the sources of its power and the dynam-
ics of its political operation.
The ʿAbbāsid family formed an important element in this elite.⁸ The caliph’s
numerous uncles, the Banū ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās, and his cousins were
appointed to governorates in the western part of the caliphate, notably in Syria,
Egypt and the prosperous and peaceful province of southern Iraq (most impor-
tantly in the city of Basra). They did not, however, serve in the Iranian provinces;
al-Saffāḥ’s brief appointment of one of his uncles as governor of Fārs was abrupt-
ly terminated by Abū Muslim.⁹ Nor did they serve in the Caucasus or North Afri-
ca, areas likely to see serious military activity and where Khurāsānī soldiers were
stationed in large numbers. In some cases these ʿAbbāsids formed sub-dynasties
passing the title of governor from father to son, for example Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī (d. 152
H/769 CE) and his sons al-Faḍl (d. after 163 H/780 CE) and ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 196
H/811–12 CE) in Syria, and Sulaymān b. ʿAlī (d. 142 H/759–60 CE) and his son
Muḥammad (d. 173 H/789 CE) in Basra.
The granting of these prominent roles assured the loyalty of the wider ʿAb-
bāsid family to the ruling branch of the dynasty, discouraging internecine rebel-
lion or usurpation. Governors also provided a focus of dynastic loyalty for the
people of the provinces. This is especially clear in the case of Syria. Many ele-
ments in this large and potentially turbulent province found themselves exclud-
ed from positions in the army with the end of Umayyad rule, but the patronage of
Ṣāliḥ and his sons assured the continuing loyalty of at least some of them to the
ʿAbbāsids. This was made very clear during the short reign of al-Amīn, when
ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ was able to recruit large numbers of Syrians to support
the caliph against the eastern Iranian armies of his brother al-Maʾmūn.¹⁰
 This section expands on Kennedy 1981/2016, 73–95, where I first began to investigate the elite
of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, iii, 71–72.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, iii, 841–845.
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Members of the ʿAbbāsid family were also wealthy property owners; for ex-
ample, Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī, who took over most of the extensive property in northern
Syria developed by Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik and other Umayyad princes.
This meant that even when they held no formal government position, the ʿAbbā-
sids retained influence in their provinces. Although they visited the caliphal
court in Baghdad, it seems that they resided in their own districts most of the
time.
It is clear that al-Rashīd, or rather his Barmakid mentors, sought to under-
mine the power of these sub-dynasties. Upon Muḥammad b. Sulaymān’s death
in Basra, his house and vast fortune were confiscated by the caliph. Neither
his brother Jaʿfar or any children he may have had were allowed to inherit his
position in the city. Similarly, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ spent the last six years of
Hārūn’s reign in prison because the caliph was apprehensive about the power
he wielded in Syria. Members of the family were still property owners in comfort-
able circumstances but their place in the political elite was greatly diminished.
After the death of ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ in 195 H/811 CE no ʿAbbāsid remained
who could rally the Syrians to the support of the caliph as he and his father had
been able to.
During the 3rd century H/9th century CE, the role of the ʿAbbāsid family was
greatly restricted. No members of the dynasty governed provinces or commanded
armies except for the caliph, those of his children designated as heirs, and occa-
sionally a brother—as in the case of al-Muwaffaq, brother of the caliph al-Muʿta-
mid (r. 256–279 H/870–892 CE) and leader of the campaign against the Zanj in
southern Iraq.With these changes, the ruling dynasty became disconnected from
the inhabitants of many of the provinces, for whom the ʿAbbāsid family became
an absent and increasingly irrelevant group.
Some other families who had been important in Umayyad times continued to
be powerful under the new regime, either because they opposed the later
Umayyads or because they offered support to the new dynasty allowing their pre-
vious allegiance to the old rulers to be conveniently overlooked. The most nota-
ble of these families were the Muhallabīs.¹¹ Originally from the Azd tribes of
ʿUmān, the Muhallabīs rose to prominence in Umayyad service and played a
major role in defeating the Khārijite rebellions that threatened the caliphate in
Fārs and other areas of Iran. Al-Muhallab and his son Yazīd had been major fig-
ures in Umayyad politics, but in the later decades of Umayyad rule they had
been marginalised. However, they still retained power and influence in the
 For the general history of the family, see EI2, “Muhallabids” (P. Crone), and Crone 1980,
133–35. For their role in the ʿAbbāsid elite, Kennedy 1981/2016, 82–3, 190–2.
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city of Basra, and on the approach of the ʿAbbāsid armies in 132 H/749 CE they
brought the city over to the cause of the new dynasty. Over the coming decades,
they were rewarded with important provincial governorates and military com-
mands, notably in Egypt and North Africa and eventually in Sind as well. In
North Africa they formed a minor dynasty referred to many centuries later by
the local historian Ibn ʿIdhārī (d. c. 712 H/1312 CE)¹² as the dawlat al-muhāliba.
If things had turned out differently, it might well have been the Muhallabīs
rather than the Aghlabids who were remembered as the first independent rulers
of Muslim Ifrīqiya (Tunisia). In the event, their rule was terminated by the caliph
al-Rashīd and their evanescent dawla disappeared. Nonetheless, the history of
the family shows clearly that the ʿAbbāsids had no qualms about making use
of the talents and influence of these important supporters of the previous dynas-
ty. The Muhallabīs brought with them influence in Basra itself and in the Basran
trading networks that led from North Africa through Egypt (where there were Mu-
hallabī governors) to Basra and the Gulf and finally to Sind (where there were
also Muhallabī governors). In return for governorships, the family brought the
caliph influence in areas where ʿAbbāsid armies seldom reached. It could be ar-
gued that the Muhallabīs mediated caliphal soft power in the southern fringes of
the empire and among the merchant and commercial classes.
The most important source of military power for the caliphs was the group
known collectively as the quwwād. The term qāʾid (pl. quwwād) is one of a num-
ber of Arabic words for leadership used throughout Arabic historiography. In the
early ʿAbbāsid period the term had an almost technical meaning, describing the
cadre of military officers who formed the backbone of the contemporary ʿAbbā-
sid army. By tracing the careers of members of some of these families, we can
establish a profile of the group and their trajectories. Among the well-known
families were those of Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzāʿī, Musayyib b. Zuhayr
and al-Ḍabbī, ʿUthmān b. Nahīk al-ʿAkkī, ʿĪsā b. Māhān and others. Here I
have chosen to concentrate on two, the families of Khuzayma b. Khāzim al-
Tamīmī and Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭāʾī. I shall also discuss the family of Maʿn
b. Zāʾida al-Shaybānī, who though their origins were different had much in com-
mon with the other quwwād dynasties.
Almost all the quwwād came from Khurāsān. The first known members of
this elite joined the armies of the ʿAbbāsid revolution from 130 H/747 CE on-
wards. Many of them had served Abū Muslim, the leader of the revolution in
Khurāsān, but changed their allegiance to the caliph al-Manṣūr after Abū Mus-
lim’s execution. They all bore Arabic names and their nisbas show that they
 Ibn ʿIdhārī 1948.
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claimed to be descended from well-known Arab tribes. Whether this is actually
true or they were Iranian mawālī who wanted to claim Arab origin is impossible
to ascertain. They seem to have been Arabic speaking and the language of the
army was probably Arabic, though it is likely that the Arabic-Persian hybrid lan-
guage we now know as New Persian was developed in their ranks at this time.¹³
The non-Muslim populations of the Jazīra were certainly aware of their eastern
origins, and describe them as Persians.¹⁴
This elite had a number of distinctive features. Firstly it was geographically
mobile. Members typically served in different provinces of the caliphate, return-
ing to Baghdad between terms of office to be given new appointments. Alterna-
tively they might enjoy a period of office in the capital itself by serving as mem-
bers of the elite military units attached to the caliphal court, the shurṭa (police)
and the ḥaras (guard). When they were appointed to governorships or military
commands, this was symbolised by the handing over of a liwāʾ or banner of of-
fice. They were, in fact, an elite who owed their loyalty to Baghdad and the ca-
liphate rather than to the provinces they governed, a truly pan-imperial cadre.
The leading figures among the quwwād retained contacts in the Khurāsānī
places where their families originated. They may well have returned on visits
and almost all the major families produced at least one provincial governor.
At the same time they were also given properties called qaṭāʾiʿ (sing. qaṭīʿa) in
Baghdad.¹⁵ Typically these included dwelling houses, a market, a square
(raḥba) and sometimes a mosque. They settled their troops in these urban quar-
ters, where the men could benefit from the commercial opportunities afforded by
the expanding new capital. It is likely that the quwwād families recruited soldiers
from their native Khurāsān and from those of Khurāsānī descent who had settled
in Baghdad. They may well have been responsible directly for the payment of sal-
aries to their men, but we have no clear information regarding this.
The composition of the military following of the first family of quwwād stud-
ied here repays more detailed examination. The family of Khāzim b. Khuzayma
al-Tamīmī¹⁶ was closely connected with his town of origin: Marw al-Rūdh, a
small city on the Murghāb river whose site now lies on the border between Uz-
bekistan and Afghanistan.When he was sent to ʿUmān in 751/2 to fight the Khāri-
 Bulliet 2009, 140– 142, argues that New Persian emerged as a language used by cotton trad-
ers to do business. I would argue that it is at least as possible that it emerged among the
Khurāsānī military contingents led by the ʿAbbāsid period quwwād.
 The Chronicle of Michael the Syrian (1899– 1910) makes this very clear.
 For the distribution of properties in Baghdad, see al-Yaʿqūbī 1892, 140–55, now available in
an English translation, al-Yaʿqūbī 2018, I, 73–87.
 Crone 1980, 180–1; Kennedy 1981/2016, 81–2.
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jite rebels, his forces consisted of men from his ahl (family), his ʿashīra (tribe),
his mawālī (freedmen), the people of Marw al-Rūdh and some Tamīmīs who
joined him as he passed through Basra. All these men were in some way depend-
ent on or related to him. Four years later he was fighting Khārijite rebels again,
this time in the Jazīra with 8,000 men of Marw al-Rūdh. In 758–759 he was or-
dered back to Khurāsān to fight the governor, who had rebelled against the ca-
liph. On his approach the people of Marw al-Rūdh rose up against the rebels,
captured their leader and handed him over to Khāzim, showing that despite
some ten years absence in the west he still retained close links to his native
town. When he died, his power and position passed to his son Khuzayma,
who was able to raise 5,000 armed supporters in Baghdad on the night in 169
H/786 CE when the caliph al-Hādī died. The family owned a prestigious house
in a central part of Baghdad, strategically placed at the east end of the city’s
main bridge of boats. In 198 H/813 CE, though Khāzim himself was old and
blind, this house became a meeting place for supporters of al-Amīn who wished
to negotiate his peaceful surrender to Ṭāhir and the supporters of al-Maʾmūn.¹⁷
We are well informed about the family of Khāzim because of the high-profile
campaigns he fought in, but he was likely typical of the qāʾid cadre. He raised
the troops he commanded and he probably distributed their pay. He was in
fact not a mere employee of the caliph, but (along with the rest of his family)
a contractor who needed to be rewarded and respected for his services. Without
the loyalty of such figures, the caliph would have been unable to maintain con-
trol over his vast empire.
Another typical family of quwwād were the descendants of Qaḥṭaba b. Sha-
bīb al-Ṭāʾī,¹⁸ but the trajectory of this elite family is rather different from that of
Khāzim. Qaḥtaba came from the same Arab-Khurāsānī background as Khāzim.
He had been the leader of the army Abū Muslim sent to the west to install the
ʿAbbāsids as caliphs, and would certainly have enjoyed a leading position
under the new regime if he had not been killed crossing the Euphrates in the
final stages of the campaign. He left two adult sons, al-Ḥasan and Ḥumayd,
who both enjoyed long but very different careers in the ʿAbbāsid imperial
elite. Al-Ḥasan took over his father’s command and joined the siege of the last
Umayyad governor Yazīd b. Hubayra in the old Umayyad garrison city of
Wāsiṭ. Here he came in contact with the caliph’s brother Abū Jaʿfar, later caliph
himself under the title al-Manṣūr. Together they forced the surrender of this last
outpost of Umayyad resistance.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, III, 916.
 For this family, see Crone 1980, 188–189; Kennedy 1981/2016, 79–80.
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The bond the two men struck up was the foundation of al-Ḥasan’s subse-
quent career. He followed the future caliph when he became governor of the
Jazīra and provided him with crucial support in his final showdown with Abū
Muslim in 755. He spent most of the rest of his long career on the Byzantine fron-
tier and in Armenia. Here he worked closely with military leaders in the frontier
districts (the thughūr), leading expeditions deep in Byzantine territory and lead-
ing projects like the rebuilding of the frontier fortress of Malaṭya. Like all the
leading quwwād he was given property in Baghdad (including a street, a
rabaḍ and houses) on which to settle his Khurāsānī followers. He died in 181
H/797 CE at the age of 84, full of years and distinction.
By contrast, his brother Ḥumayd was in some ways the black sheep of the
family. He made a number of unwise career decisions that would normally
have resulted in disgrace, if not execution. The fact that he survived shows
how dependent successive caliphs were on the support and loyalty of these
Khurāsānī families.While al-Ḥasan attached himself to the future caliph al-Man-
ṣūr, his younger brother took the side of the caliph’s uncle ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī when
he challenged al-Manṣūr for the supreme title. However, ʿAbdallāh also sought
the support of the Syrian military elites who had supported the Umayyads.
Deep-seated tensions between them and Ḥumayd’s Khurāsānī followers meant
he deserted before the final battle that saw al-Manṣūr victorious.
Despite Ḥumayd’s support of al-Manṣūr’s rival, he was appointed governor
of Egypt just five years later in 142 H/759 CE. He subsequently jeopardised his
position yet again at the time of the great ʿAlīd rebellion led by Muḥammad
the Pure Soul in 145 H/762 CE, when he fled the battlefield and almost caused
a disastrous panic in the ʿAbbāsid army. Once more he was rehabilitated, serving
as governor of Armenia and finally in the most powerful position open to any of
the Khurāsānī military elite: as governor of Khurāsān from 151 H/768 CE until his
death in 159 H/776 CE. Like his brother, he had properties in Baghdad.
Both al-Ḥasan’s and Ḥumayd’s sons carried on the family tradition. The third
generation played an important role in supporting al-Amīn against his brother
al-Maʾmūn in the great ʿAbbāsid civil war after the death of al-Rashīd. Like
most of these families, the descendants of Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb lost everything dur-
ing the long conflict. Their properties in Baghdad were destroyed and their con-
nections with Khurāsān cut off. They were completely excluded from government
office during the caliphates of al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim.
Not all of the families who constituted the military elite were of Khurāsānī
origin and not all had supported the ʿAbbāsid revolution. The family of Maʿn
The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Political and Military Elite 107
b. Zāʾida in fact broke most of the rules that might lead to advancement.¹⁹ They
were the most prominent of the ashrāf (nobles) of the bedouin tribe of Shaybān,
which dominated most of the northern Iraqi steppes. They had a substantial fol-
lowing among their fellow tribesmen and could bring experienced and hardy
warriors to serve in the ʿAbbāsid armies—but they also had fierce and deter-
mined enemies within their own tribe. As tribal leaders, they were opposed by
Khārijite groups from Shaybān and by other tribes bitterly hostile to the ashrāf
who served both Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphates.
Maʿn b. Zāʾida had been a leading supporter of the last Umayyad caliph Mar-
wān II; he went so far as to claim that it was he who killed Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb at
time of the crossing of the Euphrates. Those two facts would have made relations
with the new regime strained, to put it mildly. With his record, it would seem
most improbable that his family would enjoy elite status under the ʿAbbāsid ca-
liphs. Yet that proved the case. Maʿn went perfunctorily into hiding after the fall
of the Umayyads but he was clearly hovering, looking for an opportunity to in-
gratiate himself with al-Manṣūr. His chance came with the rebellion of the Rāw-
andiyya, a group of radical Shīʿites, in Baghdad. It caught the caliph off his
guard and Maʿn was present to save his life. After this al-Manṣūr recognised
that Maʿn, along with his Shaybānī tribesmen, was a valuable supporter. He
was sent on distant and unglamorous postings to places like Yaman and Sīstān,
and was killed in 152 H/772–773 CE in Bust (in the modern Helmand province of
southern Afghanistan) when a group of Khārijites dug through the flat roof of his
house and surprised him.
He seems to have left no sons. His position within the tribe and his feud with
the Khārijites was inherited by his nephew Yazīd b. Mazyad, whom Khārijites
pursued to Baghdad and attempted to murder on the city’s bridge of boats.
Yazīd b. Mazyad became a leading military commander in the reign of al-
Mahdī but found himself on the wrong side of a major political conflict when
the caliph was succeeded by his son Mūsā al-Hādī. Mūsā enjoyed strong support
among military leaders and Yazīd played an important part in this. He is said to
have been among those who urged the new caliph to remove his brother Hārūn
from the succession and to execute his mentor and leading supporter Yaḥyā the
Barmakid. In the event, the sudden death of Mūsā al-Hādī and Hārūn’s accession
meant that Yazīd, like other quwwād, was in deep disgrace and perhaps lucky to
escape with his life.
Apart from a short spell as governor of Armenia, Yazīd remained in the po-
litical wilderness for almost a decade until the caliph was once more in need of
 For this family, see Crone 1980, 169– 170.
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his military abilities and tribal following. The Jazīra was disturbed by a wide-
spread Khārijite rebellion led by the charismatic and romantic figure of al-
Walīd b. Ṭarīf al-Shārī, who was said to have been from the same Shaybānī
tribe as Yazīd. The forces sent by the Barmakid administration were unable to
deal with these fast-moving opponents until, despite the advice of Yaḥyā b. Khāl-
id, the caliph called on the services of Yazīd. He led his tribal following (ʿashīra)
against the enemy, defeated the rebels and killed their leader al-Walīd, whose
grief-stricken sister composed one of the greatest laments in classical Arabic lit-
erature on his death. Yazīd was now firmly back in favour with the caliph. His
career prospered and he served Hārūn in Khurāsān, on the Byzantine frontier
and in Armenia, where he died in 185 H/801 CE.
His son Asad inherited his tribal following and it would seem his prestige.
During the great civil war, he was a vigorous supporter of al-Amīn and was
known as fāris al-ʿarab, the ‘knight of the Arabs’. Like his father and uncle,
he was looked up to as an exemplar of the ancient bedouin virtues of courage
and generosity. Unfortunately, the defeat of al-Amīn meant that Asad lost
power and influence. He had no place in the new ʿAbbāsid caliphate as it was
reconstructed by al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim; Arab tribal followings were not al-
lowed to participate in the new military organization of the time, dominated as it
was by eastern Iranians and Turks. However, unlike many of the other quwwād
families under discussion here, the Shaybānī ashrāf reinvented themselves, sur-
vived and prospered.
In 171 H/787 CE Hārūn had appointed Yazīd b. Mazyad as governor of Azer-
bayjan, a province requiring a firm military hand to keep the locals peaceful
whilst defending them from the Khazars to the north.²⁰ When he died in the pro-
vincial capital of Bardhaʿa, his son Asad was appointed to succeed him. It seems
as if the family connection with the province continued. In 245 H/859–860 CE
the caliph al-Mutawakkil appointed Yazīd’s grandson Muḥammad b. Khālid as
governor of Bāb al-Abwāb (Derbent) and its surrounding districts. “He rebuilt
the city of Ganja and was granted it and the estates (ḍiyāʿ) in the area as heredi-
tary possessions (irthan)”.
With the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in the next year, caliphal control
over the Caucasus effectively collapsed and left the family in control. In the
years to come the descendants of Maʿn b. Zāʾida changed their collective identity
and with it their familial claim to leadership. Instead of being ashrāf of Shaybān,
they took the ancient Iranian title of Shirvān Shāh and claimed descent from the
 For the complicated events taking place in Azerbayjan in the 3rd century H/9th century CE, see
Madelung 1975, 243–249.
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semi-mythical Sāsānian hero Bahram Gur.²¹ Beginning with Manuchehr, who
succeeded in 418 H/1028 CE, the members of the family bore Persian rather
than Arab names. The dynasty survived in the eastern Caucasus in one form
or another until the mid–13th century, coincidentally disappearing at almost
the same time as the ʿAbbāsids finally lost Baghdad.
The Shaybānī elite survived when other families of quwwād lost their status
and identity for a number of reasons. The most important was their enjoyment of
tribal support that was not necessarily dependent on salaries from the dīwān in
Baghdad or revenues from Khurāsān. Though the tribe was clearly divided be-
tween supporters of the ashrāf and supporters of the Khārijites, there were tribes-
men who had followed their leaders and settled in Azerbayjan where the family
established their power base in later generations, having an almost hereditary
position in the eastern Caucasus before the death of Hārūn and the great civil
war. Although they fought on the losing side that time, they had a power base
beyond the reach of al-Maʾmūn and his victorious general Ṭāhir. They did not
even suffer from the loss of their property in Baghdad after the civil war, because
seemingly they never had any. As we have seen, the family survived, but only by
adapting themselves to new circumstances in new areas and adopting an entire-
ly new political personality: as Iranian shahs, not Arab ashrāf.
The last family I want to consider in detail is that of al-Ashʿath b. Qays al-
Kindī. Their history illustrates another pattern of continuity and survival
among the elite of the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid caliphates. Descended
from the kings of the great south Arabian tribe of Kinda, the family of al-Ashʿath
came from the highest echelons of the pre-Islamic Arab nobility. Al-Ashʿath him-
self had pledged allegiance to the Prophet but joined the ridda (apostasy) after
his death. Despite this, because of their status as tribal leaders the family still
remained influential among the Kindīs who settled in Iraq during the Umayyad
period. Al-Ashʿath’s grandson, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, led the last great, unsuccessful
rebellion of the ashrāf of the Iraqi tribes against the Umayyads in 82 H/701 CE.
Under the early ʿAbbāsids, the Kindī leaders enjoyed a modest revival of their
power, with several of their members appointed as governors of Kufa.
Unlike the Shaybānīs, who could clearly mobilise a nomad force from their
tribesmen, the influence of the Kindīs seems to have been urban and based in
the city of Kufa. Though they never reached the top ranks of the ʿAbbāsid
elite, they were important in securing the loyalty of the people of Kufa to the ʿAb-
bāsid cause, especially when faced with the ʿAlīd rebellion of Muḥammad the
Pure Soul in Medina in 145 H/762 CE. The fact that the city, so turbulent in
 See Vacca 2017, 144– 145.
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Umayyad times, was peaceful throughout the first ʿAbbāsid half-century must
have been in part due to their influence.
This was the family that produced the famous intellectual Yaʿqūb b. al-Sibāh
al-Kindī, known as the ‘philosopher of the Arabs’. Like many of the leading fig-
ures in Kufa, he had moved to Baghdad as the city lost economic and political
status in favour of the capital. Yaʿqūb seems to have built up his famous library
from the wealth he inherited from his illustrious family, but appears to have had
no personal military or political ambitions himself.With his death, we lose touch
with the family, but their story is an interesting one of elite survival and progres-
sive adaptation to the Rāshidūn, to the Umayyads and to the ʿAbbāsids. They
moved from tribal leaders, to defeated rebels, to functionaries of the ʿAbbāsid
state, and finally to the intellectual eminence that ensured the Kindī name
was the only one of the early ʿAbbāsid elite families to remain well-known in
later centuries, as its reputation spread to the cathedral schools and universities
of western Europe.
The dominance of this early ʿAbbāsid elite was ended by the great civil war
that followed the death of the caliph al-Rashīd in 193 H/809 CE. His son al-Amīn
enjoyed the support of most of the early ʿAbbāsid elite. Led by ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b.
Māhān, the quwwād of the Khurāsāniyya were defeated near Rayy in northern
Iran by the much smaller army of the supporters of al-Maʾmūn. Although
some figures of the elite remained at al-Maʾmūn’s court, the army commanders
(notably Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn) came from eastern Iranian families with no previous
connection with the ʿAbbāsid court. They had been thoroughly alienated from it
by the harsh taxation policies of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā.
This defeat, and the subsequent siege and ruin of Baghdad, destroyed the
power base of much of the elite. The quwwād no longer enjoyed the financial
support of the government to recruit and pay their followers, and they were
cut off and excluded from their ancestral homes in Khurāsān. None of the
quwwād families who had dominated the military structures of the early ʿAbbā-
sid caliphate played any important role in the caliphate re-established by al-
Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim. The only member of the group known to us is Naṣr
al-Khuzāʿī—and not as a supporter of the caliphate, but as the man who led
the rebellion in Baghdad protesting the enforcement of the doctrine of the creat-
edness of the Qurʾān.
It was not only the quwwād whose power was destroyed by the coming of the
new order. The members of the ʿAbbāsid family who had played such important
roles in the early ʿAbbāsid elite, representing the family (so to speak) in the great
cities of Basra and Kufa, in the sawād of Iraq, Syria and sometimes Egypt, dis-
appear at this time from the political stage. It is a sign of the changes in the early
3rd century hijrī that the sources no longer tell us the names of the governors of
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these great cities and provinces, except when they are involved in some disturb-
ance or battle like the defence of Basra against the Qarāmiṭa. When we are told
their names, they are always members of the Turkish and eastern Iranian milita-
ry, not members of the ruling family. We are informed incidentally that the de-
scendants of the great ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ, effective ruler of much of northern
Syria, still lived in the neighbourhood of Manbij where he had constructed a
celebrated palace, but there is no indication they played any part in the political
life of the province. The provincial elites could no longer look to the patronage
and protection of ‘their’ members of the ruling family, and this connection with
the dynasty was lost.
The elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate is remarkable in Islamic history be-
cause of its variety, its broad base and its many contacts.We cannot understand
the history of this great dynasty unless we look beyond the narrative of the ac-
tions of the caliphs to those who supported and influenced them.
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